‘Enough is Enough! “Fear and Trembling” is Not about Ethics’

Author: Ronald M. Green; Reviewer: Micheal Guirgies

The main point of this article^[1], if it is not stressed enough by its title – is its emphasis on an apparent and significant concern within Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, and that is the denunciation and transcendence of ethics as it is determined by the world; - an embracing of a duty – one that is stressed not to be necessarily a kind of morality in the way in which we understand it - belonging not to society, but rather to God.

In the introduction to Fear and Trembling by Alastair Hannay, it is importantly noted that the underlying faith and motivation behind Abraham’s obedience lies in his acceptance that “human life, Isaac’s, Abraham’s, everyone’s, acquires its meaning and value from the source of creation itself, not from the ‘raging elements and forces of creation’ that…bear him along in the world”. This is what Hannay claims to be the “sum of what Johannes de silentio(a pseudonym with which Kierkegaard wrote the book) can say”.

However, in speaking about a morality definition in the way society generally upholds(and for this we refer to Hegel’s notion of it, for this is what Kiekergaard focuses on), a moral act becomes simply that which benefits society as a whole. A father may thus execute his son on the grounds that it may serve the universe totally; but if in the case that the father execute his son on different grounds than that of the society at stake, then “ethically speaking, [he] would be dammed”(Hannay). And this is the situation which we must analyse with respect to Abraham, for it is not the State which calls Abraham to commit his deed, but something that is exactly not the State.

Can it be possible to call upon reason to justify Abraham’s case?

Green argues exactly the opposite:

“Abraham’s ethical individualism then becomes a noble protest against the Hegelian apotheosis of the nation state or, alternatively, a prophetic defence of the individual in a world increasingly dominated by herd morality…”

And he condemns all interpretations through ethical reasoning, such as this one which he explicates thus:

“…all who understand that ethics sometimes permits and even requires us to transcend parochial group loyalties must realise that Abraham’s conduct merits our highest praise.”

So thus, it is imperative that we focus on this line where he says:

“Any effort to provide an ultimate and ethically compelling justification of Abraham’s conduct must deal with these strong denials that Abraham’s behaviour can in any way be ethically understood.”

For it is precisely because of the fact that society did not, in any way, implicitly or explicitly, call upon Abraham to sacrifice Isaac – it is purely done in obedience to an absolute which he believed, in which he had faith, was higher than society – so therefore he can never be reconciled with society. But the fascinating point is that Abraham(and it is crucial that we understand this)did not merely sacrifice his son Isaac. Isaac was to be for him the promise of future generations, Isaac was in that moment for him in both a personal and ethical sense the entire world. Those moments in his ride with Isaac to the mount in Moriah, were fraught with internal pain and suffering because he knew that not only he was to lose his son Isaac, but that he was completely and utterly alone, since no one would understand him, most of all Sarah his wife for whom Isaac too meant literally everything in as much the capacity that he did for Abraham.

But why then should we admire Abraham?

If we are to consider again what Isaac meant to him, the sacrifice undeniably must be said to lie outside selfish reasons; meaning that, there was nothing that would have benefited him from sacrificing Isaac. This is a different, and most pertinently, honest sacrifice. Most sacrifices related through tradition can be portrayed in a way so as to present the one sacrificing as gaining from this sacrifice – but this is not the case with Abraham. The sacrifice is then pure from selfish pursuits, it is a completely selfless act, since by Isaac’s death, not only would the world suffer, but Abraham too would lose the world, he would lose his only offspring. Thus, even with the world in mind, the act is certainly to be admired – remembering that we are only considering the case in which Abraham is a logical character, he is not for us simply a “madman”.

How can we Justify Abraham’s case?

This can be done by considering the heart of Kierkegaard’s assertion in Fear and Trembling; Green corresponds with the writers who adjudge that “we can best understand Abraham’s conduct as obedience to a direct command by God that took precedence for him over any rational ethical duties he might have had.”

Quoting from C.Stephen Evans ^[2], Abraham’s act can be explained thus:

"Abraham knows God as an individual; he knows God is good, and he loves and trusts God. Although he does not understand God's command in the sense that he understands why God has asked him to do this or what purpose it will serve, he does understand that it is indeed God who has asked him to do this. As a result of his special relationship, Abraham's trust in God is supreme. This trust expresses itself cognitively in an interpretive framework by which he concludes, all appearances to the contrary, that this act really is the right thing to do in this particular case. God would not in fact require Isaac of him…; or even if God did do this thing, he would nonetheless receive Isaac back…Abraham's willingness to sacrifice Isaac might be compared with the confidence of a knife-thrower's assistant in the accuracy of a knife-thrower's aim."

There is nothing more to be said – there is no more justification needed – on the grounds that Abraham believed this to be true he is therefore justified. And as Kierkegaard tells us, no one can condemn him under moral grounds because it was not under - but higher than - moral grounds that he committed this act – therefore, we must judge him(again, remembering that Abraham is an entirely logical being)according to his faith in God, i.e., his belief in absolute Love, and this is manifested through the joy with which he received Isaac his son:

“But what did Abraham do? He came neither too early nor too late. He mounted the ass, he rode slowly down the path. All along he had faith, he believed that God would not demand Isaac of him, while still he was willing to offer him if that was indeed what was demanded. He believed on the strength of the absurd, for there could be no question of human calculation, and it was indeed absurd that God who demanded this of him should in the next instant withdraw the demand. He climbed the mountain, even in that moment when the knife gleamed he believed – that God would not demand Isaac. Certainly he was surprised by the outcome, but by means of a double movement he had come back to his original position and therefore received Isaac more joyfully than the first time. Let us go further. We let Isaac actually be sacrificed. Abraham had faith. His faith was not that he should be happy sometime in the hereafter, but that he should find blessed happiness here in this world. God could give him a new Isaac, bring the sacrificial offer back to life. He believed on the strength of the absurd, for all human calculation had long since been suspended.”( Kierkegaard, p.65)

1. Article source: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40015166
2. Quote Taken from: “Is the Concept of an Absolute Duty toward God Morally Unintelligible?" In Kierkegaard's “Fear and Trembling": Critical Appraisals, 140-51.)