Deciphering "Fear and Trembling'"s Secret Message

Michael Guirgies -

Author: Ronald. M Green; Reviewer: Michael Guirgies

Overview of Topics:

  1. First, what is it to sin?
  2. What is the problem of sin?
  3. What is the solution for reconciling sin with repentance?
  4. How, then, can we justify a teleological suspension of the ethical?
  5. What then, is the hidden meaning that Kierkegaard permeates in his discussion of sin?

Uniquely, this article[1] purposes to visit one of the less obvious, but indeed most significant questions that lie in the centre of book - in the third problemata – and this is to do with how the problem of sin can be reconciled as an “ethical self-contradiction” through a telos that lies above the ethical itself, which is nothing but God.

First, what is it to sin?

Sin is nothing but a transgression against the universal(the ethical), and this can be done in two ways: either the individual sins by pursuing the aesthetic(his own desires that lie contrary to the collective: a crime), or by committing an act based on religious grounds(where the individual is greater than the universal). It is important to note that the awareness of sin is nothing more than a result of a serious imposition of some ethical code. For if one were not to take seriously upon enforcing a moral code, then sin would not exist – and this is described by Kierkegaard as a ‘comedy’.

That is, the more seriously we take to enforcing and describing a set moral code and suggesting it to others, we are inevitably to result in a situation where the individual will never be able to completely be loyal to the universal. For if, as Kant describes, one were to be only partially aligned with the moral code, or even almost exactly par with it, it is the same thing as not holding the moral law as one’s highest priority. These two cases, ethically identical to each other, “wills self-regard as [their] highest motivation in all cases.”(Green)

What is the problem of sin?

Immediately upon discussing sin, we are naturally inclined to discuss a means of reconciling one’s effacement with the conditions of the ethical. Green presents the problem thus:

“First, there is the question of how repentance is even possible. Since the individual who undertakes to repent for a prior act of wrongful willing is, in a fundamental sense, a changed person, how can this 'new' personality be asked to assume the burden of moral anguish properly due a former self? Does repentance not violate our deepest ethical convictions? Second, even if it is possible to think that the moral debts of one's former self can be carried on to a present self, how can these debts validly be discharged? Since the self is called upon at every moment to will the utmost commitment to the moral law, where is the 'surplus' of striving to be found that is needed to discharge past debts? Finally, how can the self be sure that its momentary change of heart is genuinely enduring, that the very changeability of the will might not undermine even the most concerted efforts at moral reform?”

If we are to take the rational approach, knowing that the individual simply cannot completely and utterly comply with the law, it is plausible that the only way to atone for his deed is through capital punishment – and we would expect Kant to make these conclusions – but as the ultimate rationalist, he does not:

“…Kant's essentially Enlightenment presuppositions and his strong personal distaste for elements of orthodox Christian faith prevented him from taking the final steps to which his own rigorous philosophical analysis led him.”(Green)

Although we know this to be the rational, logical ultimatum, we do not press it, for our passion for existence – our conscious, deep-set understanding of life’s worth -  inhibits us from immediately making this decision.

What is the solution for reconciling sin with repentance?

The only possible way to legitimise repentance, we must step beyond the ethical, above the ethical, simply because we know the ethical cannot stand partial loyalties and expects pure, absolute compliance from all moral agents. As Green desribes, the “…need for a transcendent act of divine grace to effect forgiveness of the self and a new empowerment of the will” presents itself to us almost with primitive instinct. This is the step Kierkegaard makes which Kant does not: recognising the essentiality of a telos higher than the ethical in solving this problem of forgiveness.

“[For] ethics, properly understood, does lead to an awareness of sin and the need for repentance…[The] categories of ethics alone and the most impassioned moral rededication in repentance cannot remedy the problem of sin but only heighten it. As Kierkegaard says in the 'Concept of Dread', ‘repentance cannot annul sin; it can only sorry over it’”.(Green)

Since sin will never vanquish, but only increase, moral law can do nothing but fall to the knees of something higher than it, and this, Kierkegaard explains, is nothing but God.

How, then, can we justify a teleological suspension of the ethical?

Simply put, if it is on the grounds of something higher than the ethical, which is not to be confused with an aesthetic purpose, then it is justified, for in that case, the individual is higher than the ethical.

Now, it is extremely important to not be misunderstood here: a permissible teleological suspension of the ethical does not entail that, in the case that God may for some reason, hypothetically, tell us all to ‘kill our neighbour’, mean by any chance that we must, out of duty, do as God says. This is not at all the consequences Kierkegaard is here implying: we do not become more important than the ethical, but rather, in compliance with God, the ethical becomes transvalued, it contains a new kind of significance to us – for God is not against the ethical. God permeates through the ethical and gives it its own validity. For God’s commandment to us is nothing but to ‘love our neighbour’ – we, by God are commanded to love our neighbour, and this is to mean that we must be completely in compliance with the ethical, the universal.

The reader may see at this point some deep-rooted contradiction here: why did God, in complete opposition to the ethical, command Abraham to kill Isaac? If God permeates through the ethical, and if God has commanded us to love, why now command murder itself? The answer is simply this: it was to test Abraham’s faith. But what does this mean?

Abraham, in complete compliance with God’s command, took the three days journey to the Mount of Moriah, completely willing to sacrifice his son, but never gave up his love for Isaac, that is, he did not emotionally give up Isaac, because of the fact that he believed, on the strength of the absurd, that we was to receive Isaac back again. That is, Abraham, had faith that God was love, and therefore would not allow Abraham to actually kill Isaac – this was the test. The test was not the sacrifice itself, but rather the faith that he would not actually need to sacrifice.

A teleological suspension of the ethical is justified on the grounds that one has faith that God is love, a faith that God would not actually allow for it to happen.

What then, is the hidden meaning that Kierkegaard permeates in his discussion of sin?

In referring to Kierkegaard’s familial position, his ancestry was stained with a sinful past, and therefore doubted that he could ever rise from such a spiritual burden in time for him to marry his love Regina. Green tells us that Kierkegaard refused the marriage on the grounds that he did not have faith that the stain of sin could be wiped from his family – he did not believe that he was worthy of his sinless spouse, that he “felt a divine “no” had been pronounced against the union”.

Thus the question which Kierkegaard raises is expressed by Green as follows:

“Is it possible that Kierkegaard saw in this aspect of the story(this is referring to the story of Abraham) a relationship between father, son and God that addressed one of the most urgent questions of his own life: can God intervene to put an end once and for all to the family tradition of sin? Is such grace to be imagined?”
  1. Link to Article Source is here: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20006260